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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE
HALLADAY,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 17754

vs.
CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW
and NORMA G. BIGELOW,

MADGE

DefendantsRespondents

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title to certain
property located adjacent to property of defendants.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court quieted title in plaintiffs of the parcel

w-x-Y-Z

on Appendix Exhibit A attached hereto, and quieted

title in defendant Bigelow of the area between Parcel 1 and
Parcel 2 colored in brown on Appendix Exhibit A, and quieted
title in defendants Cluff and Bigelow of Parcel P-M-N-0 on
Appendix Exhibit A.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs respectfully request the court to reverse
the decree of the lower court quieting title to Parcel P-M-N-0
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on Appendix Exhibit A in defendants and quiet title to said
parcel in plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1927, the property in the area P-M-N-0 on Appendix
Exhibit A was acquired by John E. Clift. (Record at 345).
John E. Clift did not pay taxes on P-M-N-0 in 1946, 1947,
1948, 1949, and 1950.

(Record at 337).

In 1951, Parcel

P-M-N-0 was sold at a tax sale and was purchased by George
Collard.

A tax deed was issued to and recorded by Mr. Collard.

Mr. Collard owned no other property in the vicinity of Parcel
P-M-N-0.

(Exhibit 29).

On or about July 16, 1958 George E. Collard and Rosella
J. Collard, his wife, conveyed Parcel P-M-N-0 to Albert
Halladay and plaintiff Mack Halladay.

(Exhibit 29).

On

or about November 7, 1958 Albert C. Halladay and Maude
Halladay his wife quit claimed their interest in Parcel
P-M-N-0 to plaintiffs Mack Halladay and Merle Halladay,
his wife.

(Exhibit 29).

Plaintiffs had acquired Parcel

7 on Appendix Exhibit A in 1950 and later acquired Parcel
6 in 1961.

(Exhibits 6 and 7).

On the line M-N there exists a fence which was erected
more than 50 years ago.
O-P.

(Record at 54).

There is no fence along the line
The property taxes on the parcel

P-M-N-0 have been paid by plaintiffs since 1958.

(Record

at 199).
Defendants Cluff and Bigelow have on occasion occupied
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

Parcel P-M-N-0 for the purposes of gardening and farming and
business purposes.

When plaintiffs purchased Parcel P-M-N-0

in 1958, plaintiff Mack Halladay told defendant Perry Bigelow
that he (Mr. Halladay) had purchased the P-M-N-0 property.
(Record at 277).

During the period from 1970 to 1980, Mr.

Halladay informed Mr. Bigelow on several occasions that he
(Mr. Halladay) owned the property and that Mr. Bigelow should
not make use of the property.

(Record at 278).

Defendant

Perry Bigelow did use part of Parcel P-M-N-0 with the permission
of plaintiff Mack Halladay for the purpose of raising a
garden.

(Record at 176).

In 1978, plaintiff Mack Halladay

prevented defendant Perry Bigelow from building a potato
cellar on the

P-M-~-0

property.

Plaintiff informed defendant

Bigelow at that time that he (Mr. Halladay) owned the ground
and that defendant Bigelow would have to move the potato
cellar back onto his own property.

(Record at 178).

Prior to 1978, defendant Madge Cluff Kelson had never
had any discussion or dispute with plaintiff Mack Halladay
concerning the P-M-N-0 property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE INASMUCH AS PLAINTIFFS
ACQUIRED PARCEL P-M-N-0 AS A SEPARATE TRACT OF
LAND AND INASMUCH AS P-M-N-0 WAS OWNED BY THIRD
PARTIES UNTIL 1958. THE ONLY THEORY AVAILABLE
TO DEFENDANT UNTIL 1958 WOULD BE ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The court concluded that a boundary line had been estabSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
,~~-;c;~~=.;0-~s~~oei~'2;·~ense.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The court erred because the parcel of

land affected was owned by a third party during the pertinent
time and thus was not susceptible to being affected by an
agreement between these parties or their predecessors in
interest.
The lower court found that the M-N fenceline has marked
the boundary of occupancy of the defendants Cluff and Bigelow
and their predecessors' interests since before 1948.
at 54).

(Record

However, the only period of occupancy by defendants

that is material to this case is from the year 1958 when
plaintiffs purchased Parcel P-M-N-0.

The reason occupancy is

not material is because P-M-N-0 was owned from 1927 to 1958 by
third parties who did not own property north of the fenceline.
For defendants to have acquired any ownership interest
in Parcel P-M-N-0 prior to 1958, defendants would have had to
have met the statutory requirements of adverse possession,
Title 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended.

There was

no evidence presented that defendants have paid any taxes on
Parcel P-M-N-0 or that plaintiffs' predecessors in title
acquiesced in the M-N fence as a boundary.

Prior to 1958,

Parcel P-M-N-0 was owned by the Clifts and the Collards.
Defendants could not have acquired title by acquiescence to
Parcel P-M-N-0 prior to a long period of years after 1958 when
plaintiffs acquired that property.

It is undisputed that

defendants have not met the requirements of title by adverse
possession to the Parcel P-M-N-0.
Prior to plaintiffs' acquisition of Parcel P-M-N-0 in
-4-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1958, plaintiffs owned Parcel 7 as shown on Appendix Exhibit
A.

Plaintiffs ,acquired Parcel 6 in 1961.

Therefore, defendant

Cluff could not have acquired any title by the doctrine of
boundary of acquiescence to Parcel P-M-N-0 prior to 1961
inasmuch as plaintiffs otherwise would have been acquiescing
away the entire parcel, rather than merely acquiescing in a
certain fenceline as a boundary between adjoining parcels.
Furthermore, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
simply is not applicable to the facts of this case.

This is

not a case wherein Party B purchases Black Acre and Party
W purchases White Acre and the two parties acquiesce in a
certain existing fenceline as a boundary between White Acre
and Black Acre.

In this case, plaintiffs own White Acre

and defendants own Black Acre.

Subsequently plaintiffs

purchased Green Acre (Parcel P-M-N-0) which lies between White
Acre and Black Acre.
White Acre.

A fence lies between Green Acre and

At the time plaintiffs purchased Green Acre, the

fenceline M-N had been in existence for fifty years.

Defendants

are now attempting to acquire Green Acre in its entirety by
claims of boundary by acquiescense.

Although plaintiffs may

have allowed defendants to occupy portions of Parcel P-M-N-0,
plaintiffs did not purchase an entire parcel of ground simply
to give it away to adjoining landowners.

Purchasing real

estate is not acquiescence that a third party may have it.
Plaintiffs' purchase of Parcel P-M-N-0 is antithetical to
their acquiescence in the M-N fence as a boundary between
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plaintiffs' property and defendants' property.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE LOWER COURT IS
INSUFFICIENT TO CREATE A PRESUMPTION OF
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.

Should the court find that the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence is applicable to the facts of this case, that
doctrine would not be applicable as between plaintiffs and
defendants Bigelow until 1958, and as between plaintiffs and
defendant Cluff until 1961, inasmuch as until those dates
plaintiffs did not own property which would lend itself to
acquiescence in the M-N fenceline as a boundary line.

Plain-

tiffs did not acquire Parcel P-M-N-0 until 1958, and plaintiffs
did not acuire Parcel 6 until 1961.
Utah 2d 156, 389

~·

In Fuoco v. Williams, 15

2d 143 (1964) the court stated:

This court over a period of years has formulated four elements which must be shown by the person
claiming title by acquiescence in order to raise
the presumption that a binding agreement exists
settling a dispute or uncertain boundary. These
elements are: (1) occupation up to a visible
line marked definitely by monuments, fences or
buildings and (2) acquiescence in the line as
a boundary (3) for a long period of years (4) by
adjoining landowners. If these four elements
exist then it is incumbent upon him who assails
title by acquiescence to show by competent evidence
that a boundary was not thus established. But
if the party claiming title by acquiescence fails
to carry his burden and raise the presumption,
then there is no case at all.
389 P. 2d 145.
In the present case, it is undisputed that defendants
have occupied up to the visible M-N fence line on various
occasions.

However, it is disputed that there was acquiescence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in the M-N fence as a boundary line for a long period of years
by adjoining landowners because P-M-N-0 was owned by third
parties from 1921 until 1958.

In Fuoco v. Williams, supra,

the court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded
the case to the lower court because although "it was conceded
that defendants had occupied the land up to the ditch for a
long period of years and that the dispute was between adjoining
landowners," there was no evidence that the defendants had
acquiesced in the ditch as a boundary.

Upon remand the lower

court found that there had been mutual acquiescence, but the
Supreme Court reversed that decision on appeal.
In order to establish a boundary by acquiescence,
it is not necessary that the acquiescence should be

manifested by a conventional agreement, but recognition
in acquiescence must be mutual, and both pa~ties must
have knowledge of the existence of the line as a
boundary line.

*

*

*

The Williams, who claiming title by acquiescence,
have failed to prove all of the four elements necessary
to raise the presumption that a binding agreement exists
settling an uncertain boundary. Therefore, title to
the disputed tract must be quieted in the Fuocos.
Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282 421 P. 2d 944, (1966).
See also Goodman v.

Wilkinso~,

629 P. 2d 447 (Utah 1981); Hales

v. Frakes, 600 P. 2d 566 (Utah 1979).
In Hales v. Frakes, supra, the court held that "the district
court could properly determine in that case that the plaintiff's
occupation to the fence without interference was not sufficient
to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a
hnnnn~rv_"
600
P. Law2d
559.
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney
Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In the present case, there was no evidence that plaintiffs
ever acquiesced in the M-N fence as a boundary line.

The M-N

fenceline represented the North boundary to a parcel of real
estate plaintiffs purchased in 1958.

(Record 173).

Mack

Halladay testified that in 1976 Provo City asked permission
from him to put a heavier power line across Parcel P-M-N-0,
and that Mr. Halladay helped in trimming the trees.

He also

testified that defendant Perry Bigelow used part of the
P-M-N-0 property for a garden with the permission of plaintiff
Mack Halladay.

Plaintiff Halladay permitted defendant Bigelow

to use his irrigation water in the garden.

In 1978, plaintiff

Halladay prevented defendant Bigelow from building a potato
cellar on the P-M-N-0 parcel.

He told defendant Bigelow that

he (plaintiff Halladay} owned the ground at that time and that
defendant Bigelow would have to move back onto his own property.
(Record at 175-178).
Defendant Bigelow testified that plaintiff Halladay had
told him around 1957 that he (plaintiff Halladay) had purchased
the P-M-N-0 property (the property was not actually purchased
until 1958, however).

He also testified that when he (defendant

Bigelow} ever started to do something on the property that
plaintiff Halladay would tell him that he should not do it and
that he (plaintiff Halladay) owned it.

Defendant Bigelow

testified that plaintiff Halladay had so informed him off and
on over the past ten years.

(Record at 277-278).

Defendant

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Madge Cluff Kelson testified that between 1948 and 1978· she
never had any discussion or dispute with plaintiff Halladay
concerning the P-M-N-0 property.

(Record at 223).

There is no testimony that any question about a boundary
line arose prior to 1978.

Mr. Halladay has always claimed the

P-M-N-0 property even though he allowed defendants to use it.
Whether or not plaintiff acquiesced in the M-N fence as a
boundary between plaintiffs' and defendants' property is a
question of law which can be reviewed on appeal by this court.
In Molden & Sons Inc., v. Osaka Landscaping and Nursery, Inc., 584
P. 2d 968 (Wash. App. 1978), the court discussed the distinction
between questions of law and questions of fact as follows:
The trial court stated as a finding of fact,
that the plaintiff had cured the breach. The
fact that a court designates its determination
as a "finding" does not make it so if it is in
reality a conclusion of law. Under Washington
practice a conclusion of law mislabled as a
finding, will be treated as a conclusion.
In Leschi v. Highway Comm'n., 84 Wash. 2d 271,
at 283, 525 P. 2d 774, 783 (1974), a finding
of fact was defined as an
assertion that a phenomenom has
happened or will be happening independent
of or anterior to any assertion as to its
legal effect.
In applying that defini t-ion to the facts
at hand, it is clear that whether the plaintiff
had provided new cinders would be a finding
of fact. However, whether the replacement
of cinders constituted a "cure" is a determination
of the legal effect of that action and is thus
a conclusion of law. Therefore, the pertinent
standard of review is whether the conclusion
of law, that a cure resulted, is supported by
the evidence. (Omitting citations).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Similarly in Cities Service Gas Company v. State
Corporation Commission, 201 Kan. 223, 440 P. 2d 660 (1968)
the court stated:
An ultimate finding is a conclusion of law or
at least a determination of law and fact.
It
is to be distinguished from the basic findings
of primary evidentiary or circumstantial facts.
It is subject to judicial review and, on such
review, the court may substitute its judgment for
that of the commission.
(Helvering v. Tex-Penn.
Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491, 57 S. Ct. 569, 81 L. Ed. 755.)
440 P. 2d 661.
In the present case, acquiescence is the legal effect of
plaintiffs'

a~ts

with regard to the P-M-N-0 property.

The

only fact that indicates a possible acquiescence on the part
of plaintiffs is that defendants occupied up to the M-N fence
line on various occasions.

However, there is substantial

evidence to rebut any indication of an acquiescence by plaintiffs.
As the coutt held in Hales v. Frakes, supra, the mere occupation
of property to a fence line without interference does not
necessarily result in acquiescence by the record title holder.
Neither does the failure to claim to the true boundary line
result in acquiescence.

Hales v. Frakes, supra; Glen v.

Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P. 2d 257 (1949); Ringwood v.
Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P. 2d 1053 (1954).
As previously mentioned, plaintiffs have on many occasions
claimed ownership of the P-M-N-0 parcel during the period
of plaintiffs' alleged acquiescence in the M-N fence as a
boundary line.

The evidence not being sufficient to establish

acquiescence on the part of plaintiffs, no presumption of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Assuming, arguendo, that there were some evidence indicating
an acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, the record

indicate~

that any such period of acquiescence would be less than twenty
years.

Only in the "rarest of cases" may a boundary be establishec

by acquiescence of less than twenty years. Hobson v. Panguitch
Lake Corp., 530 P. 2d, 792

(Utah 1975); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah

2d 135, 378 P. 2d 893 (1963).
As to defendant Cluff, any period of acquiescence would
not have begun until 1961, the year in which plaintiffs
acquired Parcel 6.

Prior to 1961, plaintiffs did not own any

property north of the M-N-f.ence which would facilitate plaintiffs
acquiescing in the M-N fence as a boundary between plaintiffs
and defendant Cluff's property.

It is inconceivable that

plaintiffs would acquiesce in the M-N fence as a boundary
between plaintiffs' and defendant Cluff's property prior to
1961 since it would mean that plaintiffs would be giving away
all of their land north of defendant Cluff's property.
Therefore, any possible acquiescence on the part of plaintiffs
with regard to the Cluff property would have been from
1961 to 1978, a period of only seventeen years.
As to defendants Bigelow, defendant Perry Bigelow testified that plaintiff Mack Halladay has told him off and on
over the last ten years, that he (plaintiff Halladay) owned
Parcel P-M-N-0.

According to defendant Bigelow's testimony,

plaintiff has claimed ownership of Parcel P-M-N-0 since 1958
and more particularly since 1970.

Therefore, any possible

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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acquiescence by plaintiffs could only have occurred from 1958
to 1970, a period of only twelve years.
The fourth element necessary to create a presumption of
boundary by acquiescence is that there be mutual acquiescence
by adjoining landowners.

Prior to 1958, there could be no

acquiescence because the landowners north of the M-N fence did
not own the P-M-N-0 property.

As to defendant Cluff, the

property north of the M-N fence was not owned by the owner of
the P-M-N-0 property until 1961.

Therefore, as to defendants

Bigelow there could be no acquiescence by adjoining landowners
until 1958, and as to defendant Cluff there could be no
acquiescence by adjoining landowners until 1961.
Defendant having failed to establish three of the four
elements necessary to create a presumption of boundary by
acquiescence, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has no
application to the facts of this case and title to the P-M-N-0
property should be quieted in plaintiffs.
POINT III
ANY PRESUMPTION OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE WAS
REBUTTED BY PLAINTIFFS' AND DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE
THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT OR DISPUTE AS TO
THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES.
Should the court determine that the evidence is sufficient
to create a presumption of boundary line by acquiescence in the
M-N fence, this presumption is rebutted by evidence that there
was no agreement between plaintiffs and defendants as to the
boundary between their properties.

In Wright v. Clissold, 521

P. 2d 1224 (Utah 1974) the court stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Once these elements are established the court is
required to presume the existence of a binding
agreement unless the party who assails it proves by
competent evidence that there actually was no agreement between the adjoining landowners or there could
not have been a proper agreement. Facts which prove
the latter include the following: (1) no parties
available, e. g., sole ownership of the property
with the existing line which was later transferred
in tr acts ta· two or more other persons; {2) the
line was set for a purpose other than setting a
boundary; (3) the absence of a dispute or
uncertainty in fixing the boundary, and (4) possible
mistake or inadvertance in locating the boundary
on facts that would warrant relief in equity.
521 P.2d 1226.
In the present case there was never a dispute among the
parties as to the boundary between their respective properties
until 1978.

This action was initiated in 1979 after defendants

Bigelow had begun erecting a building which partially extended
onto the P-M-N-0 property.

Defendant Perry Bigelow testified

that plaintiff Mack Halladay has informed him over the years
that plaintiff Halladay owns the property and that defendant
Bigelow should not use it.

Plaintiff Halladay has given

permission to Mr. Bigelow to use both the land and his
irrigation water on other occasions, however.

With respect to

defendants Cluff, the evidence merely indicates that there has
been no discussion regarding the boundary between plaintiffs'
and defendant Cluff's property.
In the absence of any dispute or uncertainty, and in
light of plaintiffs' comments to defendants Bigelow, the
evidence shows that there was no agreement among the parties
as to the M-N fence being a boundary line between their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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respective properties.

Therefore any presumption that the M-N

fence is a boundary line between plaintiffs' and defendants'
property was rebutted by the evidence presented both by
plaintiffs and by defendants.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of boundary line by acquiescence is not
applicable to the facts of this case because the property in
dispute, parcel P-M-N-0, is part of a separate, identified
tract of land created by deeds of conveyance in 1927 which was
owned by third parties until 1958.

The property in dispute is

Green Acre located between Black Acre to the South and White
Acre to the North.

It is not part of a larger parcel of land

severed by a fence erected because of an uncertainty as to the
boundary between plaintiffs'
(Black Acre) property.

(White Acre) and defendants'

The fenceline is the boundary between

Green Acre and White Acre.
The evidence is insufficient to create a presumption

of

boundary by acquiescence because the facts do not indicate
acquiescence in the M-N fence as a boundary line for a long
period of years by adjoining land owners.

In any event, any

presumption of boundary by acquiescence has been rebutted by
evidence that there was no agreement that the M-N fence would
serve as a boundary between plaintiffs' and defendants'
property and there was no uncertainty as to the boundary
between the parties' respective properties.

Therefore,

plaintiffs respectfully request the court to reverse the
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holding of the lower court with respect to the P-M-N-0 property
and quiet title to that property in the plaintiffs.
Dated this _:/. day of

/'.?a'V'-'<¢°(,1/ ,

/I

l/

1982.

l
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellants' Brief,
postage prepaid, to

s.

Rex Lewis, Esq., Attorney for Defendants

Bigelow, and to M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., Attorney for Defendant
Cluff, addressed as follows:
S. REX LEWIS
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys at Law
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah . 84601
M. DAYLE JEFFS
JEFFS & JEFFS
Attorney at Law
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah
84601
January 4, 1982.

BRENT D • Yo/UNG

/

(.

J

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

A P P E N D I X

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
"'Vil I

,.J ~·~

$

I~
'

:-

. ,.r

~

,
.Q

l

I gl

,t/

~>

I~ HALL-ADAY

Q

,I

~-~ _'_~61

w<>r

0

L=·~,~

~,

G)

thence Jtorth 1' Lot 40 Cul; thlf't1C . . ~¢cth o• )S'1..2· '."es.t
South )6'"!.!'t..J• [.ast 9.,219 fre.t: t~('nCit Sout?\ 5Y' [.Ht ~q •

1•

~II~

l·MLLAOA'{

d

r'Y)

,!

"I

/;~

:-;I

~

sI

"''--

j . -..

i

f
I

~

'-

'-

.

"'-®

.•

ij

~

fq59

HALLADAY·~
.
. '.

.-

I

r

o

i•

-1:~

•

L.(.J

Jq1:>3
IALl..ADAV

:-

"\

the po1at o( btilnnlnc,,

I<it

~. K.Aclt Hal lad•)". c~nclng, ~.51 chain.s l.'c:st .a:i.d 4.16 ch .. ~tU ~orth 1·00· [ u t o(
the Southc•:it Corocr oC s~ctlon 2, Tovu.s:hlp 7 SOcU~h. 1'110~ .. :. [•Jt, S..alt U\.t a.1u
and l'ictldt•n; thtnCI' Non?-t 1•00· [ast )]J.t .. fut; th~rlCf: ~th 6~·~1· \,"f:st s;,%
'fut; th~nct SoYt~ ~o•;,,5· \.'est ~'.'1.00 Crct; t~«'ncc: Sot.Jth 1 •·x~· \.'itJt )-0:;:,6.:. [,ct;
th-tnce: SotJth 6Q.OC1' [Ht L5l du1os to the P.."'dnt of ~ .. ic.::t{n,.

.

lJ /

..

~.n

~i

I

11•
'!' \

t1i/

'

I

I

~11~

(3)

• I

0

:j i~

w

)

'6 • •

'r-•

'

»

._,,·

!_1~ff~

-

J

t

.

~

..

~'"·
~1

!J.,,,.,,., . . ~v
~ !1
~'-

. ~~~_,-;;-..a
.

/

I>.'.,.-.')'

.. ~~v
Y".

I

,$

._,

~J _

I

I
!

__J _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

loo .:iOUT}/ SiCEGT

I

I
~-.
L.
_____J~
1

1

~.,, ~
•I

!. Ii

i
. /1

.•11~

,: •I • ii·

,

I

:

"I

tfl_______~ ·I
I1

11
\I

~r

i;

~ -~------11~-----11

.I1

..,,

[Li

11;

!i
'"

)

;.. i~j

II

J

~

1

~;~~ !I
A.- .( _,,.u-trll •m<
1, , ,,__

I
''
~I

~

j

~I'-

I

I

Ka<."k. H.11l•d,.'.t' - (~nclnh ).b) cb.alf'.1 •·e!lt .a:-.d 10,t..~ C"..1~:1i ~Mlh l'CYJ' r. .. ~~ ... cd
).~ ch.. fn.s !-iorth dq'OQ' ~1ot t.r.d !\Orth :•(>(l' [ & ! I t ) fOC:S •~d ~OTt!"l .:.q•O':·' ~Ot

60.~0 ( u t H.d 2.5.~5 Cc:ot Sout!i l '00' \."1t o! the Sot.1t~e:.&'t (ornu <·! SHtlC:l 2;.
Tovtuhlp 7 South. R..,n~" l C..-s,t, .<"·•l~ La~c- !.:tj.t' and !"lt-T"!CI•"":: t~an·~t SoJJth 1·oc·
t .. st li'l.l} !•et: ttl~OClf So\.lth sQ·('o)' l H t l>J.00 tC"et: [.!':;'lf"~t' ~Ort."', - rw,:
t~1•ncc: t'ort.h 8Q'C-0' West 61.00 !lftt; tne:ncit ~-:inh i•oc• L.ut 114.00 {t"t't; t.he:ncc
SoYt.h s3·2~· IJ«n t! .. ~ ! u t t.o thlf po1n~ oi t><eginn!n~-

1

. /

cv

].

1

'" •

"'/

I

•; :

... 1•

fl1I
j

·

•
:

...
·~/·

~-

'I

.

.

•

~i

.

~ ~

·'I

;-w

~:

-1
I..
.. ,..

i

!~11 r
'

/1 ,

1
1

! I,

1

:

1

11

e,, Keck Hal}..d.ay • C~octnt ).b) c'rulns \.:est ..11nO }0.•5 ch .. to., ~orlh t•'2"J' t.aH
and 3.~ chalnJ ?"v:-th 6~'00' \.'est H.d ~ort!'l l '-:x>' EHt ) re<:, .and ~orth 519'C·)'
'w'tsl 80.~ fc:tt .o-! 2'.'>.S} !Ht South i•00• ·.. c- to! t:i~ ~c';o:~.....ut Cor";\t:f" o! 5-Ht.il)
2, Tovnshlp 7 Sm.ith, P...tnt;t 1 [a.d. $.alt LIJ..c:
"H~ and ~c:rld!•n; thf'n.:::t So..:t~
b}.,l' ,_. ._..st ::..,5-0 !c:c:t; thc:ncc $outh !'X·' La '!.. tJQ.~ t~t':.; thence S.01,,1t..."": ~-:o·c·::i·
[Ht f:IS.00 f~C"t; t.'anc:~ Sorth l '00' \.'e:n t:":. ) (t:f"t t.:> the p.:;lnt C"~ ~~.pn::d.r..; •

;

~1::,J /q65
ic_wFF d61e.ewvvri:HnLuwA

i~

J~

,.>7;:

"'..:;'."'

ICf lfBl·:I 1q47

, ,I

~-

~: ~
~~~ ;-, ~-

/H~~-~--·:"j
Ii I~ t

I

ji

)(

; •
~

®

p

l~~·"l (<ct: t..hen.:c
!t~t; thieocc S~th

I;

I
!

~1~.:_~T-=·1 -~~;&~~~~~:~~-=~
:

.:.

lll.00 ! u t to t.ht polat o( ~i,lnntn._.

.:.. Htrlt ;;•ll•d•y • Coc:r...enclric, 6. 7~ ch.alo.s \.'irst .1n.:! 7. ~ c:h.1fe1 S0rth of thir So'"·t.!le•st Corner of Stc:tlon 1, Toto."Osh!p 7 South, 1'.an.;ir l t•-.t. ~.1!t L..ii)." ~.ue an.!
H<trtdl•n: th,ncc- :-oonh 7LOO Ctet; thtnc~ \."c::it 2.~} ch.at:i.s; t~tnce: Sout!'i: ~S.W
hct; thence- Lot LJ} ch•ITH to the p<>lnt of b~&lnolc•·

i i i
.~~i
Iw....
-~
~-if
, I i .,,:>~-I
I . % -~rl!;:.··
i ,~-~;-~--...~--,.--;,.: ~,.- ,..,...,_, 7 ~- ----.:.J
·~ I !.~:"~-"~~:;~ -.-!-.s~-'-'C.«>"
I~
\"\

'""'t

). !Udge Clutf - Coc::E'JitnCh( 2t.l.~ ! u t \.'e'l .ait'.ld ?~.OS fut ~rth and Hf..~ fut
'forth .5'9• \.'ot f-OCl thir S:>0thee1~ Cori"!r ~c Stctt,.n ! 1 '!~""!,htr 1 S:.:-·..1t~. ~-r·t.e
2 [ u t 1 Salt Lalt• ia.u •nd l'itrldl.10: thence ~.:>rth t\~' •:it>l );; • .;. lc<"l; th"t"o<..-c:
1
HoTth l ' t u t 2'H.00 {C""tt; thrnct So\Jth ~1 1 [as;t ~9.L.0 f u t ; thence $0\.lt:-i 0 l5"
.;.2• r.aH 1~8.t...Z recq th.enc.it \o'cst 5.,70 leeq t!'ien<:it SoYt~ l ' li.'t't JL.!>6 fut t.:>

1qso_ ,-/b ~1

!,,<,

K.eck 4.. Hfil laC.1y • COC'C'IC"nd"" J.6~ ch..1ns '..'ot .and ).~S dw!:u North .aoJ: )
ch.ata..1 !i(')rth 59" \lc~i !roa. lhc S.V\.lth•••t Conuc o{ S'1cttoa l. Toto."nlihlp 7 5,y_.:_~i.
RAn&< 2 [ut. S•lt Uk• a••• .and Seridlan: th<-~~c Sor:.h s9• .... ~st O.IT'O c?-. .s!c.s:
t.t\en.ce lfof'th 1• l.a1t J.}() c.h•lnJ.: th~nCt" Sout!ol. e~• £.ut 0.~ ch..1ini; t.he-ncc
S°'6th l' \o:'ut ).}() c:.haltt• to thot P"'1n.t of t- q:ln..._.,lt1&.

l. f'it<"ry 1:.. at,tlov .. c~ncl:i..' ).6) chains ~·est aod ).$0 c:-..a.!~' !forth .and 3_q.,
ch:aln• North 89• \.'•st (rc;..r.. the s..._.... uth~•s~ Corccr of Se:c.t!o::.:i :. To ..ti.i.~·dp 1 S.:i:.::.!-.,
ll•ng• 2 t.ast. S•lt Lalo.If a• .,, anJ ~crldtan: l~~~;::t Sorth _:q• -.:ut n.~ fft-t;

JI

....

I

·?

~

~I

-- ~·
~I
~I

L

'J.

.\

-~

l----Nl1•"°'1./ $1.<IQ'

4

-~~
,.;J!f?·

I

A/S'I• Cu'A/ .s?. .;.o·

)f

,1

F
I

Ff.Na wc.ax;;t-1

BRENT YOUNG

MACK H..i.u..ADAY PRO-tRTY
!OX) ~T ~ SOJTH

ll(GISTCRCO

CfVIL

PIC.-0
R.

CL'r0£

NAYLOR

(NG1 .. C(RS

...... 0

L.ANO

IMJRVltYORS

OREM•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-----------~--------- 1-~-~:-80 i--~==~r
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UTN4

., ~;~••

_.....

m

!

•;.;;_~;'"'1-J

